


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GREECE BEFORE THE PEACE CONGRESS OF 1919

A MEMORANDUM DEALING WITH THE
RIGHTS OF GREECE

SUBMITTED BY

ELEUTHERIOS VENIZELOS
PRIME-MINISTER OF GREECE

A REVISED TRANSLATION FROM THE FRENCH ORIGINAL

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GREECE BEFORE THE PEACE CONGRESS

THE complete victory of the Allied and Associated States affords the occasion to fix the political frontiers of the European States in exact accordance, or at any rate in approximate accordance, with the limits of their ethnical domain. In this way the indispensable basis of the Society of Nations will be created.

The Hellenic nation is distributed as follows:

1. 4,300,000 inhabitants of the Kingdom of Greece;
2. 151,000 in Northern Epirus and Albania;
3. 731,000 in Thrace and the region of Constantinople;
4. 43,000 in Bulgaria as it was before the Balkan Wars;*
5. 1,694,000 in Asia Minor;
6. 102,000 in the Dodecanesus;
7. 235,000 in the Island of Cyprus;
8. 1,000,000 or thereabout, distributed variously: notably in Egypt and in the rest of the African Continent: 150,000; in North and South America: 450,000; in Southern Russia: 400,000.

All told, the Hellenic nation comprises 8,256,000 souls, of whom 55 per cent live in the Kingdom of Greece and 45 per cent outside its limits.

What are the Greek populations, living outside the present Kingdom of Greece, which might be included in it if its frontiers were extended?

The inclusion of the 1,000,000 Greeks scattered all over the world is, of course, out of the question.

Let us consider, then, the Greek populations of the Balkan Peninsula, of Asia Minor and of the Islands.

* The territories which were annexed to Bulgaria by the Treaty of Bucharest carried with them other 88,000 Greeks.

THE BALKAN PENINSULA

I. NORTHERN EPIRUS

Northern Epirus comprises a mixed population of 230,000.

The districts of Courvelessi, the parts of the *kazas* of Tepelini and Premeti, which are situated to the north of the Voyoussa, and the *kaza* of Starovo (lying to the north of the Devoli), their population being practically entirely Albanian, might, without inconvenience, be detached from Northern Epirus and attached to Albania. There would then remain in Northern Epirus a Greek population of 120,000 and an Albanian population of 80,000, so inextricably mixed that it would not be possible to separate them geographically in such a manner as to include the Greeks in the Greek State and the Albanians in the Albanian State. Greece maintains that this mixed population ought necessarily to be allotted to her, for it would be contrary to all equity that a majority with a higher civilization should have to submit to a minority with an inferior civilization. Granted that Albania would be unable to exist as an independent state except under foreign guardianship, one cannot see why this mixed population should be included in the Albanian State, which is incapable, at least for the time being, of possessing a really autonomous government, and not in the Greek State, which already enjoys an independent political existence.

One may be tempted to raise the objection that a substantial portion of this Greek population has Albanian as its mother tongue, and is consequently, in all probability, of Albanian origin; but the democratic concep-

GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS 3

tions of the Allied and Associated Powers cannot admit of any other criterion of nationality than that of national consciousness. Only the Teutonic conception could prefer the criterion of race or of language. Notwithstanding that the majority of them speak Albanian, the Greeks in Northern Epirus have formed part of the Greek family for centuries, long before the foundation of the Kingdom of Greece. They furnished, in the course of the War of Greek Independence, many of the military leaders of the revolted nation. One of the finest pages in the history of Greece records "the dance of Zalongo," where the women of Souli, whose mother tongue was Albanian, threw themselves from the height of a steep mountain, after having cast their own children into the abyss, in order not to fall into the hands of the Mahomedan Albanians, who were besieging their country.

It may be useful to add that Mr. Repoulis, the present Vice-President of the Greek Ministerial Council, General Danglis, the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army, Admiral Coudouriotis, the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Naval Forces and Minister of Marine, as well as the majority of the crews of the Greek Navy, speak Albanian as their mother tongue.

As to that which is more particularly Greek in the character of Corytza, which the Albanians today attempt to put forward as the center of their intellectual movement, it should be noted:

1.—That the Greek schools, supported exclusively by legacies from the people of Corytza, had before the Balkan Wars 2,250 scholars, whereas the single Albanian school, although carried on under excellent American management, had only about two hundred;

2.—That thirty years ago the Greek community of this town refused a legacy of \$120,000 (or 600,000 francs) left by Liaktsis Avramidis, because it had been

4 GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS

bequeathed under the condition that Albanian should be taught in the Greek schools. This decision, the meaning of which I need not dwell upon, shows what degree of fanaticism the national sentiment of the community had reached.

3.—That in 1886 the same community declined another legacy of \$20,000 (or 100,000 francs) left by Hercules Douris, solely because it was devised to the "Orthodox Community of Corytza," whereas they wished to be called "the Greek Orthodox Community of Corytza," thus preferring to renounce the legacy rather than the right to be called Greek, even though it was merely a question of wording in a formal document of acceptance.

It must further be noted that when, after the Balkan Wars, Northern Epirus was included, in virtue of the Protocol of Florence, in the Albanian State, and the Greek Government withdrew its troops and its officials, the inhabitants formed a provisional government and an army of their own, and refused to submit to the Albanian administration.

The Albanian State proving incapable of enforcing its power, the International Commission of Control in Albania was obliged to enter into negotiations with the Provisional Government of Northern Epirus. Long discussions resulted in the signing, on May 17, 1914, at Corfu, of a protocol which, while retaining Northern Epirus within the limits of the State of Albania, recognized the right of the former to have a local autonomous administration (see Appendix I).

At the beginning of the European War, the Prince of Wied abandoned the Albanian throne, and the anarchy, which had not ceased to reign in the country, spread more and more widely in Albania and Northern Epirus. The British Minister at Athens, in the name of the Governments of the Entente Powers, then asked the Greek Government if it would be disposed to undertake a new military occupation of Northern Epirus, in order to

establish order sufficiently to permit the Mahommedan inhabitants, who had taken refuge at Valona, to return to their homes before the winter and cultivate their lands. It was to be understood that the definite settlement of the question of Northern Epirus would be reserved for the Peace Congress. The Greek Government replied that it accepted this mandate on condition of having, in addition to the consent of the Entente Powers, that of the Italian Government. Under the auspices of Great Britain, an agreement was reached under which Italy would occupy Valona, and Greece Northern Epirus, the duty of pronouncing definitely as to these occupations being left to the Peace Congress. But it was tacitly understood that if, at the time of the general peace, the occupation of Valona by Italy was confirmed, that of Northern Epirus by Greece would become equally definite. Also, while recognizing, in the Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, the right of Italy to occupy Valona, the Entente Powers stipulated that the limits of this occupation to the south must not exceed the limits of Northern Epirus.

II. THRACE

Thrace, with Constantinople, has a Greek population of 730,822 (see Appendix II).

It comprises, according to Turkish statistics, a Bulgarian population of only 112,174.

The Bulgarians recognized so fully the Greek character of Thrace that when, in 1912, it became necessary to co-operate, in view of the elections, against the Ottomanizing programme of the Committee of Union and Progress, it was agreed between the Greeks and the Bulgarians, under the auspices of the Œcumenical Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate, that their coalition in Thrace would support seven Greek candidates against only one Bulgarian candidate.

In the event that Constantinople, whose Greek popu-

6 GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS

lation is, numerically speaking, only slightly inferior to the Turkish population, should not be restored to Greece, but should form the capital of an international state designed to guarantee the freedom of the Straits, the national claims of Greece on the rest of Thrace should, by this very fact, be strengthened.

It is true that the extension of the Greek frontier in Thrace would necessitate the exclusion of Bulgaria from the Ægean Sea, where she has been since the Balkan Wars, by virtue of the Treaty of Bucharest. But this exclusion can and should take place by virtue of the right of nations to decide their future—a principle which, it has been recognized, must serve as the basis of the coming peace.

As a matter of fact, if a line be traced, starting from the summit of Koula (Kouhlar Dag, or Hill 2,177) on the present Greco-Bulgarian northeastern frontier, thence following the course of the Arda down to its confluence with the Maritza, and then along the Turco-Bulgarian frontier of 1913 (except perhaps for a slight modification in favor of Bulgaria) to the northeast of Kirk-Kilisse, as far as Cape Iniada, there would be established between Bulgaria and Greece a natural frontier which would enable the latter to incorporate Thrace in her own territory. Since this new Greek territory would include only a very small Bulgarian minority, of 69,000 Bulgarian inhabitants, its incorporation with Greece would be in full conformity with the principle of nationality.

Moreover, if the fact be taken into account that Rumania might be disposed, once her national unity is realized, to return to Bulgaria that part of the Dobrudja which fell to her lot in 1913, and which constitutes one of the richest regions of the Balkans, one sees that, even after giving up Western Thrace, Bulgaria will be the only one of all the Allied Central Powers to emerge without loss from the war, to the prolongation of which, however, she contributed by her intervention.

GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS 7

It may be objected that, in this case, the principle of nationality should give way before the economic interest of Bulgaria in having an outlet on the Ægean Sea. But this interest is not sufficiently essential to demand the sacrifice of the paramount interest which a people feels in living under an administration in harmony with its national consciousness. The new outlines of the map of Europe will leave more than one state without access to the sea; for example, the Czecho-Slovak country, Hungary, German Austria, and perhaps Poland. Necessarily, the treaty of peace will lay down new rules of international law in order to assure to such states, under international guarantees, a commercial outlet to the sea. Moreover, although Bulgaria is already established on the Black Sea, which, thanks to guaranteed freedom of passage through the Straits, will become open and free, Greece is nevertheless disposed to grant to Bulgaria a commercial outlet on the Ægean Sea under the same conditions that states with no access to the sea will be assured of a commercial outlet.

One must, however, take into account the lessons of the submarine warfare when one is trying to find out which of the two interests is the more important and weighty; that of Bulgaria in reaching the Ægean Sea or that of Greece in preserving her territorial continuity and thus obtaining her extension in Thrace.

Bulgaria is an eminently continental state; for her defense she does not require naval strength. If she retains the coast of the Ægean, she may utilize Porto-Lago for the purpose of establishing there an excellent submarine base, which would enable her to upset, for her own benefit, the equilibrium of forces between herself and Greece.

The latter, as a matter of fact, has an island population of nearly a million and a half. In case of war, Bulgaria, with her submarines, could delay the transport and the concentration in Macedonia of the Greek forces from the

8 GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS

Islands, and thereby place Greece in a very dangerous inferiority from the point of view of defense.

So far we have examined the question without any bias against Bulgaria, as if both Greece and Bulgaria were presenting themselves before the Peace Congress with an equal right to the benevolent consideration of the judges who will decide on their opposing claims. We have arrived at the conclusion that impartial consideration of their respective interests leads to the recognition of the absolute superiority of the Greek claims.

But we must also inquire whether Bulgaria is entitled to expect any benevolence whatever at the hands of the Congress; for this inquiry will enable the representatives of the Allies to judge and regulate Balkan affairs in a manner more in accord not only with equity but also with the general interest.

People who do not know the facts from near acquaintance generally believe that Bulgaria, at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest (1913), was unjustly treated by her allies.

I desire to dispel this prejudice and I am sure that I shall succeed in this, by setting forth the history of the respective attitudes of Greece and Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars. It is necessary first of all to find out whether the claim of Bulgaria to hegemony in the Balkans rests on any sound basis.

Bulgaria sought to found this claim on the superiority of her military organization. As a matter of fact, hardly had she been created an autonomous state when she went seriously to work to organize her army; and, until 1903, she was, next to Turkey, the only Balkan State that had at her disposal a strong army.

Moreover, for a whole generation, foreign public opinion had come, not without reason, to regard Bulgaria as the only important factor in the Balkans.

If, at that moment, Bulgaria had been able, by herself, to settle the Eastern Question, in a single-handed

struggle with Turkey, it is more than probable she would have been able to establish her hegemony in the Balkans, and the other states of the Peninsula would simply have had their own lack of foresight to blame.

But since then the situation has completely changed. After the accession of King Peter, Serbia began to pay special attention to military organization, and a little later, in 1909, a similar movement began in Greece, so much so that, in 1912, Serbia and Greece were able to place well-organized armies in the field against Turkey. Greece, moreover, had a fleet, which by giving the Balkan Allies the mastery of the sea, prevented Turkey from transporting her reserves from Asia Minor to her fronts in Thrace and Macedonia, by the shortest route—that of the sea; it was this combined strength of the three states that enabled a victorious war to be conducted against Turkey.

Later on, when Bulgaria resorted to a decision by arms, suddenly attacking her own allies, Serbia and Greece succeeded in a single month in crushing her army. From that time it became manifest that Bulgaria's pretensions to hegemony could no longer be based on military superiority.

Neither could these pretensions be based on superiority in numbers or in civilization. It is obvious that Bulgaria cannot plead any such superiority over the other Christian nationalities in the Balkan Peninsula.

Can she, as compared with the other nations of the Peninsula, racially claim a numerical superiority?

According to her own official statistics of 1910, the Bulgarian State comprised, before the Balkan Wars, 4,337,516 inhabitants, of whom only 3,497,794 were Bulgarians and the rest belonged to various nationalities (Turks, Rumanians, Greeks, Gypsies, etc.).

It is certainly difficult to determine the exact number of Bulgarians not included in Bulgaria before the Balkan Wars. According to Turkish statistics (see the *Hassir*,

10 GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS

the official journal of Salonica, No. 994, 1904), there were in Macedonia, 757,532 adherents of the Bulgarian Exarchate (that is Slavs that declared themselves to be Bulgars); there were in addition 107,843 in the vilayet of Adrianople and 4,331 in that of Constantinople. If to these be added the 100,000 Bulgarians in Bessarabia, and Rumania, the whole Bulgarian nation does not reach 4,500,000. Even if we accept the most exaggerated calculations of the Bulgarian propagandists, we shall not arrive at five millions.

The total number, composing this nation, therefore, is far inferior to that of the Jugo-Slavs and to that of the Rumanians, each of which comprises a population twice as large as the Bulgarian nation, taken as a whole. It is inferior even to the Greek total, being barely 60 per cent of the latter.

One can conceive, then, to what degree the conscience of the other nationalities of the Peninsula revolts against Bulgaria's pretensions to the establishment of her hegemony in the Balkans, extending her dominion not only over the whole of Macedonia, Thrace, Rumanian Dobrudja, but even over a great part of the Kingdom of Serbia, as far as the Morava, and over at least a portion of Albania, which would place her in a position to realize her dream of the four seas—the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmora, the Ægean Sea and the Adriatic—bathing the shores of a Bulgarian Empire, of which Constantinople would be the capital.

In spite of all, during the Balkan Wars, Greece showed such moderation and such a spirit of conciliation before Bulgaria's exaggerated demands, that at the Conference of London, she did not hesitate to support the pretensions of Bulgaria to the whole of Thrace as far as Rodosto, and agreed even to abandon Eastern Macedonia to her. On her part, Serbia recognized the extension of Bulgaria up to the left bank of the Vardar, and agreed to submit to the arbitration of the Czar the dis-

putes with regard to the territories situated on the right bank of the Vardar. It is more than probable that if Bulgaria had accepted this arbitration, she would have risked losing nothing more than the contested zone, according to the delimitation established by the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty.

Consequently, if Bulgaria had not betrayed her allies, if she had not, by her aggression, provoked the Second Balkan War, she would have secured, in the Balkan territory liberated from the Turks, a larger part than that of her three allies put together—Greece, Serbia and Montenegro.

The attitude of Greece in this conjuncture may appear inexplicable. In fact, by her concessions to Bulgaria, she sacrificed nearly a million of Greeks: in Eastern Macedonia, 121,439, and in Thrace and Constantinople, 730,922. But I then believed in the possibility of creating a Balkan Confederation as a consequence of the crusade of the Christian states of the Balkans against Turkey. No price appeared, in my eyes, too exorbitant in order to attain such an objective. I also thought that in sacrificing to Bulgaria the Greeks in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, I was offering her such ample satisfaction on that side, that she would necessarily show herself more conciliatory as to Central and Western Macedonia, so as to make possible the peaceable partition of those territories with Greece and Serbia. It should also be noted that by these concessions, Bulgaria would have become as large as the Bulgaria of the San Stefano Treaty, with only this difference that she would have exchanged for Thrace a portion of Western Macedonia.

But another fact must be taken into consideration in order to appreciate the attitude toward each other of Greece and Bulgaria.

After the signature in London, in May, 1913, of the Treaty of Peace between the Balkan League and Turkey, Bulgaria began to transport into Macedonia

12 GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS

the army she had before Chatalja and Bulair, and to concentrate it in front of the Greek and Serbian armies. She made no secret at all of her design to attack her allies, as soon as the concentration of this army had been completed.

The Greek General Staff then called my attention to the state of inferiority in which we would be placed in case we permitted these movements to be carried out to the end. Our Staff recommended that Bulgaria should be requested to suspend her concentrations against our troops, threatening otherwise to attack her in order to prevent such concentrations.

I recognized fully the gravity of the situation. I refused, nevertheless, to fall in with the opinion of the General Staff, so formidable did I regard the responsibility of anyone who provoked, between the members of the Balkan League, an armed conflict which the whole world would characterize as a fratricidal war and which would be the death-blow to the idea of a Balkan Confederation. I preferred to face all the perils inherent in the act of leaving to Bulgaria the initiative of the attack, rather than to strike the first blow.

It was under these conditions that Bulgaria started the campaign against her allies.* She came out of it, as I have already said, completely beaten. Now, even after this defeat, what was the attitude of Greece?

During the Second Balkan War, Greece had occupied the whole of Western Thrace as far as the Maritza; she

* In order to extenuate the responsibility for the Second Balkan War, which weighs so heavily on Bulgaria, some Bulgars have claimed that she was obliged to attack her allies because she knew of the existence of the Greco-Serbian Treaty of Alliance.

The 5th Article of the above treaty reads as follows:

“In case of disagreement with Bulgaria concerning the frontiers as above indicated, and if any amicable settlement becomes impossible, the two High Contracting Parties reserve the right, by mutual understanding, to propose to Bulgaria that the dispute should be submitted to the mediation or arbitration of the sovereigns of the Powers of the Triple Entente or the chiefs of other states.

“In case Bulgaria refuses to accept this form of peaceful settlement and assumes a threatening attitude against one of the two Kingdoms, or attempts to impose her claims by force, the two High Contracting Parties solemnly

had driven Bulgaria back to the frontiers she possessed before the First Balkan War. Nevertheless, by the Treaty of Bucharest, Greece agreed to hand back to Bulgaria Western Thrace, where the Bulgarians formed only one-ninth of the total population, and where there were three flourishing Greek cities—Xanthi, Goumuldjina and Dedeagatch, not to mention large and prosperous rural Greek populations.

Then a surprising thing occurred. On the signature of the Treaty of Bucharest, Greece, with a view to the execution of this treaty, wished to evacuate Western Thrace and to hand it over to Bulgaria. But Bulgaria begged the Greek Government to delay the evacuation for a month in order to make preparations for the occupation of the country. She feared that, if the Greek troops retired sooner, Western Thrace would be occupied by the Turks and would thus be lost to her. Then, when the month came to an end and Bulgaria was still unprepared, she asked and obtained from the Greek Government a further delay. Greece prolonged her occupation until Bulgaria had finished her preparations. But she had scarcely taken possession of Western Thrace, when she immediately expelled the Greek population *en masse* and confiscated all their property.

The conciliatory attitude of Greece toward Bulgaria, at the time of the Treaty of Bucharest, may appear inexplicable if one takes into consideration the fact that, at that moment, I no longer had any illusions as to the

bind themselves reciprocally to assist each other with all their armed forces and later, to conclude peace only jointly and by common agreement.”

The terms of this article and the fact that the treaty was only concluded on the 19th of May, viz., several days after the serious attack of the Bulgars upon the Greek positions of Mount Panghæon, prove sufficiently that this treaty cannot excuse Bulgaria's letting loose the dogs of war against her allies.

On the contrary, it was Bulgaria's provocative attitude and her insistence on dealing with territorial questions separately with each of her allies, which led Greece and Serbia to conclude a treaty of alliance in case Bulgaria should refuse to submit the disputed questions to arbitration or should endeavor to impose her claims by force. Consequently, there cannot be the slightest doubt as to the purely defensive character of this agreement.

14 GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS

possibility of constituting a Balkan Confederation which would also include Bulgaria. The Second Balkan War had proved that, at least for a whole generation, Bulgaria could no longer form part of the projected Confederation.

The concessions made by the Greek Government, however, are explained by the fact that a portion of European and American public opinion, which was accustomed to consider Bulgaria as the most important factor in the Balkans, did not reject as absolutely unreasonable her pretensions, if not to exercise hegemony in the Peninsula, at least to occupy a preponderant place there. It admitted reluctantly the idea that Bulgaria could be deprived of the greater portion of the fruits of the common victory over Turkey. This tendency became so marked that a strong pressure was exercised upon the Greek Government with a view to ceding to Bulgaria even Cavalla, a purely Greek town, which did not include a single Bulgarian inhabitant.

It is true that, by the Treaty of Bucharest, Bulgaria had had taken away from her, for the benefit of Serbia, large territories whose Slavophone inhabitants, who had before the war been under the Bulgarian Exarchate, had generally been considered as aspiring to union with Bulgaria. But without going more deeply into the question as to whether these populations are more akin to the Serbs than to the Bulgarians, we may, with certitude, admit that they had an uncertain national consciousness. No sooner were they annexed to Serbia, than, with few exceptions, they proved to be good Serbs, just as they had previously been considered good Bulgarians; and, to render their conversion still more complete, it was enough for them to transform the termination of their names by adopting the Serbian "itch" in place of the Bulgarian "off."

In order to judge impartially the Treaty of Bucharest, one should take into account the fact that, as a result

of it, Bulgaria emerged larger, more populous, and richer than either Greece or Serbia. Driven by her blindness to attack her allies of yesterday, when attacked in her turn by Rumania and Turkey, she lost in this conflict the Bulgarian Dobrudja, Eastern Thrace and Adrianople, none of which losses she could reasonably impute to her allies; but that which remained to Bulgaria was still equal to Greece in area and population, and exceeded Serbia.

What was the policy of Bulgaria after the Treaty of Bucharest? A review of it will enable us to judge whether the responsibility of having attacked her allies on the morrow of the war with Turkey lies exclusively on King Ferdinand and the Bulgarian military leaders. If such were the case, the Bulgarian people might have the benefit of "extenuating circumstances." On the contrary, if it is found that the whole Bulgarian people has constantly endeavored to impose Bulgarian hegemony on the Balkans, the verdict must be more severe, and guarantees must be imposed against the renewal of any such attempt.

Shortly after the entry of Turkey into the European War, the Entente Powers made the most tempting offers to Bulgaria; retrocession of the Dobrudja; cession of the whole of Thrace with the exception of Constantinople and the Straits; cession of the left bank of the Vardar and, on its right bank, of the zone which was considered, according to the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912, as incontestably Bulgarian, including Monastir; cession of Eastern Macedonia, notwithstanding the protestations of the Greek Government.

Bulgaria was thus offered the opportunity of repairing the disaster which her treason in 1913 had cost her, and of becoming as powerful a Balkan State as the Bulgaria of the Treaty of San Stefano. For the second time, however, Bulgaria showed her intention of not being content to assume merely a preponderant position in

16 GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS

the Balkans, but of seeking to establish there an absolute hegemony. In addition to the whole of Macedonian Serbia, she claimed no less than a large part of the Kingdom of Serbia as it existed before the Balkan Wars. As the basis of her policy, she demanded not only the weakening of Serbia but her dismemberment. She wished further to annex a large portion of Albania, in order to become a maritime Power of the Adriatic. She wanted the whole of the Dobrudja, including even that portion which had belonged to Rumania ever since 1878. In a word, Bulgaria wanted to constitute an utterly new state, comprising 8,500,000 inhabitants, of whom barely one-half would be Bulgarians.

It was only toward Greece that the attitude of Bulgaria was at this time conciliatory. She recognized the right of Greece to the frontiers established by the Treaty of Bucharest; the word sent from Berlin was to the effect that, without this recognition, the policy of King Constantine would become impossible in Greece, and that, without this policy, Bulgarian imperialistic dreams would fade away; Bulgaria, therefore, agreed to postpone the settlement of her account with Greece. If, after the European War, she realized her dream of Balkan hegemony, she was sure of being able to seize the first opportunity to attack Greece, of finding her on the morrow of the crushing of Serbia, without friends and without allies, of taking from her Salonica, Greek Macedonia and even Epirus, and of driving her back beyond her frontiers of 1881.

Such is, in plain words, the policy of Bulgaria, which has been adopted by all the Bulgarian political parties except the "narrow" Socialists, who form only a very small minority in the Bulgarian Chamber. This is the unvarying policy which has been followed by Bulgaria from the very establishment of the Principality forty years ago. It is not a merely momentary tendency.

In view of what precedes, one can see how impossible

GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS 17

it is to satisfy Bulgaria, without completely sacrificing the other Balkan peoples, and without concessions which would assure her the immediate hegemony of the Balkans or would at least bring about its realization in the near future. Consequently, we know that any settlement of Balkan affairs, short of Bulgarian hegemony, would be accepted by her only with profound dissatisfaction.

There is therefore no reason why a benevolent disposition should be shown to Bulgaria. She should content herself with the strict justice of the Allies, and nothing more. It would be a flagrant injustice to sacrifice to her the legitimate interests of other peoples. It would be an act stained with immorality, for it would be favoring an enemy of yesterday to the detriment of an ally. The moral purification which the whole of humanity is justified in expecting after the catastrophe Germany has brought on the whole world, would be forever compromised. Above all, this would be an act of bad policy.

It must be well understood that Bulgaria seeks to play in the Balkan Peninsula the part that Prussia has played on the vast European stage. Having been the first Balkan country to organize a strong army, she believed she could easily enslave all her neighbors. The spirit of militarism is as deeply rooted in Bulgaria as in Prussia. The Bulgarians rightly boast of being the "Prussians of the Balkans." In fact, they resemble the Prussians in their militaristic spirit, in their worship of brute force, and in their inhuman manner of waging war. But they are far from equaling the Prussians in the domains of science, of letters and of art.

For these reasons, if the Allies are bound not to commit injustice towards Bulgaria, if they are to apply to her case the high principles in the name of which they have fought, they have at the same time the duty of showing no benevolence whatever towards their enemy of yesterday. If they are to carry out their work of justice

18 GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS

and not compromise the future of the Balkans, the Allies should confine themselves to according to the Bulgarians the place to which they are entitled, having regard to their nationality in its relation to the other Balkan peoples.

The question has been asked why, when I was disposed both before and even after the Balkan Wars to make such important concessions to Bulgaria, I am not today animated by any such disposition.

This change of attitude must not be regarded as an inconsistency. I have already given the reasons which impelled me, before the Second Balkan War, to make large concessions to Bulgaria; I have also stated the reasons which induced me, immediately after the war, to consent to cede Western Thrace to Bulgaria. If, even after the beginning of the European War, I thought for an instant of the cession of Cavalla to Bulgaria, I did so with the hope of securing her entrance into the war on the side of the Entente, in order thereby to assure and to hasten the victory of the Allies, as much in the interests of humanity as in the interests of my own country. No such reason any longer exists.

To persist in the same tendency, to wish still to make concessions to Bulgaria, would be, on my part, a sort of political "sickly sentimentality." My fellow-citizens would justly disavow me, for such a policy would sacrifice, without any compelling reason, the vital interests of my country, for the partial satisfaction of an insatiable neighbor, who would take advantage of it to exterminate the alien populations fallen under his domination and would draw new strength therefrom with a view to a new attack at an opportune moment.

III. CONSTANTINOPLE

In virtue of the 12th article of the programme of President Wilson, according to which Ottoman sovereignty will be maintained solely in "the Turkish portions

of the present Ottoman Empire," Constantinople cannot remain under the Turkish régime. As a matter of fact, the vilayet of Constantinople, comprising Stamboul, Pera, Scutari and the suburbs as far as Chatalja, has a total population of 1,173,670 of whom only 449,114 are Turks.

With the suppression of Ottoman sovereignty, the natural solution would be to adjudge Constantinople and its vilayet to Greece, while establishing international guarantees for the freedom of the Straits.

This solution is all the more indicated because, up to the time of the Turkish conquest, Constantinople had for centuries been the capital of the Greek Empire, and before that time had been for several hundred years a flourishing Greek colony.

Even today, the principal element in the native population is Greek. Comprising 364,459 souls, it is numerically greater than all the other nationalities put together, with the exception of the Turks. It occupies an exceptional position in regard to economic strength and intellectual activity. It supports 237 schools, with 30,000 pupils. Constantinople is, lastly, the seat of the Greek Œcumenical Patriarchate.

But if the Society of Nations were to be established now, Constantinople might, because of the great international interests involved in the possession of the Straits, form with the latter, and a sufficient *hinterland*, an international State under the protection of the Society of Nations, which would appoint its Governor for certain fixed periods. This Governor would be charged with safeguarding the international interests above indicated, and with administering the State with the necessary municipal liberties.

ASIA MINOR

The article already cited from the programme of President Wilson governs likewise the solution of the problem of Asia Minor. Ottoman sovereignty must, therefore, be limited to the interior of the country, where the Turkish element is really predominant.

To the east, the Armenian provinces, with Russian Armenia, ought to be erected into a separate State, the organization of which should be entrusted to one of the great Powers, as the mandatary of the Society of Nations. Such a mandate would be all the more necessary since, as the result of the systematic destruction carried out for the past quarter of a century under Hamidian rule, and still more by the Young Turks, it would be difficult to find an administrative district in Turkish Armenia having an Armenian majority. It is obvious that Turkey should not be allowed to profit by the systematic annihilation of the Armenian nation, which has been carried out in order to maintain her domination over the Armenian provinces. The conscience of mankind would revolt at this. Besides, these provinces are not Turkish, for the Turkish element continues to be in a minority there as compared with the combined strength of the other ethnical elements.

The vilayet of Trebizond might be attached to the State of Armenia. The compact Greek population of 350,000 people, comprised within its limits, would thus have the advantage of escaping henceforth from Turkish administration. The same is true of the vilayet of Adana, which comprises a Greek population of 70,000 souls, and which, as including also a considerable Armenian population, might, with even more reason, be incorporated in the Armenian State.

Moreover, by establishing the administrative divisions of the State on the basis of local ethnical conditions, the sorely tried Christian population would be assured an

endurable existence and would thus prepare the way for the ultimate complete independence of this State.

To the westward, in the vilayets of Aidin, and Brussa, as in the independent *sandjaks* of the Dardanelles and Ismid, live in compact and continuous masses 1,013,195 Greeks. These constitute the principal element of the native population. They have been established there uninterruptedly for three thousand years. They still constitute the real backbone of the economic and intellectual life of the country, as agriculturists, merchants, manufacturers, laborers and scholars.

Divided into 15 archdioceses and dioceses, this Greek population supports, by the resources of its own communities alone, 565 churches and 652 schools, with 91,548 pupils.

If to this population be added the almost purely Greek populations of the neighboring islands of Imbros, Tenedos, Mytilene, Chio, Samos, Icaria, Rhodes, the Dodecanesus and Castellorizo, which, both geographically and economically, form part of this country, Hellenism in Western Asia Minor shows a strength of 1,383,333 inhabitants (see Appendix V).

We may deduct from this number the 83,000 Greeks inhabiting the city of Brussa and the *kazas* to the east of this city which it would be just to leave within the limits of the future Turkish State, as well as the 111,964 other Greeks in the independent *sandjaks* of the Dardanelles and Ismid. Of these, the former should share the lot of Constantinople, while the latter should either go with them or else be included in the future Turkish State.

The remainder (1,188,359 Greeks) justifies the cutting off from Western Asia Minor, and adjudging to Greece, of a territory which would comprise, in addition to the Islands, a part of the vilayet of Brussa and the vilayet of Aidin, with the exception of the almost exclusively Turkish *sandjak* of Denizli. (Cf. map, Appendix V.) This territory has a population of 1,188,359 Greeks

22 GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS

and 1,042,050 Mahommedans, and forms, both geographically and historically, a specially distinct and separate section of Asia Minor.*

The allocation of this Asia Minor territory to Greece is claimed in virtue of the principle already accepted, according to which the "other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life, and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." (Number XII of the fourteen principles of President Wilson.)

In sanctioning the right of peoples to decide their lot,

* Asia Minor is thus described by the German geographer Philippon, in his book, *Reisen und Forschungen im Westlichen Kleinasien*, of which the fifth and last section has appeared in the course of the war, in 1915:

The Peninsula of Asia Minor presents a geographical contrast which explains the part played in history by this country, which has served as a connecting link between the Asiatic and Greco-European civilizations.

The interior of this extensive country, surrounded on north, south and east by chains of high mountains, is made up of lofty, uniform plains, which are often shut in on all sides. These plateaus themselves are traversed by lines of mountains which cut them up into smaller divisions. On the other hand, the western part of the Peninsula, starting from about the meridian which passes through Constantinople, presents a configuration which is quite distinctive; chains of mountains which vary greatly in direction, size and form are interrupted by great depressions in the shape of trench-like valleys and basins, which extend, in part, from east to west, from the mountainous crown which encircles the central plain, as far as the deeply indented coast, toward which they discharge rivers of considerable size. These depressions, even more than the nature of the mountains themselves, characterize the orographical configuration of Western Asia Minor, to which they furnish, at the same time, the most fertile land for cultivation and the easiest ways of communication. In this cutting up of the country into deep valleys, in these coasts so frequently indented by reason of these very depressions, as well as by a general sinking away of the terrain in a recent geological epoch, is to be recognized a peculiarity common to Western Asia Minor and to Greece, such that the two may be considered as constituting but one geographical entity, that of the *Ægean*. To these differences of structure and form between the interior of Asia Minor and its western part, there corresponds a difference of climate and vegetation, which is equally rich in results. For in the plateau of the interior, hemmed in, as it is, by mountains, reign drought and the severe winter of the steppes. Whereas the winds from the sea bring to the more open West, in the course of the mild winter, abundant rains, which feed the numerous water courses so that only the summer season in that region is dry. It is, then, a genuinely Mediterranean climate and a vegetation appropriate to this climate which characterize this western region of the Peninsula. Thus Asia Minor is separated right in the middle by a great natural frontier: on the one side, an inclosed plateau of an almost Asiatic nature, on the other an *Ægean* land, exactly like the Greek regions and closely connected, by nature and history, with the sea and with Greece, just beyond the sea. The result is, that now, as in the past, Asiatic civilization reigns in the interior, while Greek culture prevails in Western Asia Minor.

this principle evidently does not deprive them of the right to choose for themselves annexation to a state of the same nationality, already existing, in preference to the creation of an autonomous state. It is incontestable that such is the preference of the Greeks of Asia Minor, as to Greece, their mother country. It is, therefore, impossible to understand why we should stop with the decision that the Greeks of Western Asia Minor should be obliged to form an autonomous state, when the object aimed at today is precisely to reunite, as far as possible, under the same government, the various portions of each nationality.

If an autonomous state were created in Western Asia Minor, this state, by reason of its population and of the economic and cultural supremacy of the Hellenic element, as well as by reason of the fact that this element has for thirty centuries uninterruptedly held in these regions a predominant place, would constitute an essentially Hellenic state. The co-existence of two Hellenic states would soon create, on both sides, a natural tendency toward union. This would occasion fresh international friction, whereas, after this world war and the complete victory of the democratic nations, all territorial questions ought, as far as possible, to find their solution, and the creation of new problems ought to be avoided.

It is equally inconceivable that Ottoman rule should continue to be exercised in this western portion of Asia Minor. After the tragic experience of a whole century, it is impossible to entrust the future of the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire to fresh attempts at reform. These people know only too well that, especially during the last quarter of a century, every time that an attempt has been made to introduce reforms in their favor, the old Turks, like the Young Turks, have begun the application of them by massacring on a vast scale the Christians who were to benefit by these reforms.

In the course of the World War, 700,000 Armenians

24 GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS

and 300,000 Greeks have been exterminated. How can the Peace Congress send these unhappy peoples back under the Turkish yoke, renewing the derisive promises of new reforms in their interest? We must not, furthermore, forget that between 1914 and 1918, four hundred and fifty thousand Greeks have been expelled by the Turkish Government and have had to take temporary refuge in Greece; that several other hundreds of thousands have been deported from the coast to the interior, where the greater part of them have died. The mere reinstating of the survivors in their homes and on their confiscated lands presupposes necessarily the abolition of Turkish sovereignty.

The fact that a great proportion of the trade with the interior of Asia Minor passes through the port of Smyrna, does not militate against the solution that we uphold. Although what will be left of the Ottoman Empire will have several outlets on the sea, nothing prevents the Peace Congress from guaranteeing the use of this port for the import and export trade of Turkey.

I shall not fail to invoke a further and most weighty argument in favor of the annexation of Western Asia Minor to Greece. It is that the million Greeks who inhabit that region constitute, together with the people of the Islands, the purest part of the Hellenic race; that is to say, the portion that has best preserved its ethnical type. It must also be taken into consideration that, to the east of this western portion of Asia Minor, there is a Greek population of 922,545, divided into archdioceses and dioceses, and supporting 1,740 churches and 1,386 schools, with 100,863 pupils (see Appendix IV). It is to be hoped that a portion of this population will be included in the International State of Constantinople, and that another part of it will be comprised in the Armenian State, which will certainly be organized. Even then, however, some hundreds of thousands of Greeks will remain under the Turkish Government of Central Asia

Minor. For this evil there is only one possible remedy. Under the Peace Treaty, the Turkish Government should undertake to purchase the real estate belonging to such of the Greeks inhabiting Turkish territory as may desire to emigrate into Greek Asia Minor. The Greek Government should adopt the same policy in regard to real estate belonging to Turks who would like to move into Turkish Asia Minor. There would thus be started currents of reciprocal and voluntary migrations, thanks to which it might be hoped that in the course of a few years what is to remain of the Turkish State would be composed almost exclusively of Mahommedans.

It may not be out of place to recall that in January, 1915, the Entente Powers promised my Government very important territorial concessions on the coast of Asia Minor, and that after my retirement from office, the same promises were given to the Government which succeeded mine in April of the same year, with the assurance that the vilayet of Aidin was included in these concessions. These promises, it is true, are in no way binding on the Peace Congress, any more than they are on the Powers who made them. They were given on condition that Greece should immediately come into the war. This condition was not fulfilled, but Greece should not be held responsible for that. The Allied Powers are aware that I left no stone unturned to the end that in this world war Greece should throw in her lot with them. They also know that the Greek people have faithfully followed me. At the General Elections, after my first disagreement with ex-King Constantine, in February, 1915, the people again gave me a substantial majority, in spite of the fact that, at this election, the issue laid before them was to choose between the policy of Venizelos, who wanted war, and the policy of the King, who wanted peace. In September, 1915, when the ex-King, betraying his country, violated the treaty of alliance with Serbia, Greece did not hesitate to bring about a revolu-

26 GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS

tion, in order, by this means, to take part in the war. May I be allowed to say that, in view of such circumstances, it would have been almost impossible for a country to have pursued a more meritorious policy than has Greece.

When once Turkish sovereignty in Western Asia Minor is abolished, no other solution short of that put forward by Greece can be adopted, without flagrantly violating the principles in the name of which the Allies have fought. One of the chief and noblest objects of this war has been to defend the smaller nations against aggressions by the larger states. Western Asia Minor has been peopled for thousands of years by one of the most ancient nations of Europe. A century ago, that nation freed itself from its long servitude and gained its liberty. Since then, it has struggled to achieve its national unity. How can one conceive that the democratic peoples, after the complete victory they have won in defense of the independence of the smaller nations and their right to self-determination, could place one of the most homogeneous portions of the Greek nation under any foreign Power whatever, simply because it happens to be a Great Power, while Greece is only a small nation? How could they thus undermine, at its very base, the moral foundation of the Society of Nations?

THE ISLANDS

So far as the Islands are concerned, they have been Greek for thousands of years, and as such they ought to be returned to Greece, even without exception being made of those which, for strategic reasons, were not allotted to Greece at the time of the Balkan Wars.

It is true that by the Treaty of April 26, 1915, it was arranged between the Powers of the Entente and Italy that the latter should annex Rhodes and the Dodecanesus. But, at the time this treaty was signed, the

GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS 27

war had not yet assumed the character which was given to it later by the Allied Governments' declarations and by the principles proclaimed by President Wilson. It is now admitted that those principles will form the basis of the future Peace. The Greek Government has therefore no doubt that its great neighbor, Italy, will itself take the initiative in proposing the restoration of these islands to Greece, in view of the fact that, from the international point of view, they continue to form an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. The Greek Government is convinced that Italy cannot desire to impose its sovereignty upon purely Greek populations and thus to create a constant source of friction between two peoples bound together by their mutual relations in the past, which, along with their situation as near neighbors, invite them to a closer collaboration in the future.

APPENDIX I

The International Commission of Control, in order to avoid the resumption of hostilities, believes it to be its duty to reconcile as much as possible the point of view of the Epirote populations with regard to the special dispositions which they ask for, and that of the Albanian Government. It is with this idea in mind that the Commission has agreed to submit to the Powers which it represents, as well as to the Albanian Government, the enclosed text, which is the result of discussions between the members of this Commission and the Epirote delegates:

Corfu, May 17, 1914,

Signed:

Winchei, A. Leoni, Kral, Malidi Frasheri, Harry H. Lamb, Leon Krajawski, A. Tetriaew.

Signed subject to the approval of our Principals:
G. Christaki-Zographos, Al. C. Carapanos.

PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE TERRITORIES EVACUATED BY THE GREEK TROOPS AND FORMING THE PROVINCES OF ARGYROCASTRO AND CORYTZA

I. ORGANIZATION

The execution and maintenance of the provisions laid down for the organization of the two southern provinces are now entrusted to the C.I.C. (Commission Internationale de Contrôle). The Commission will organize the department of administration and that of justice and

GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS 29

finance. The Albanian Government, by agreement with the C.I.C., will appoint and dismiss the governors and high officials, taking into account, as much as possible, the numerical importance of the adherents of each religion.

II. LOCAL COUNCILS

The number of elective members in the administrative councils shall be at least three times the number of the *de jure* members.

III. ADMINISTRATIVE DELIMITATION AND SUBDIVISION

The C.I.C. will supervise both the administrative delimitation and subdivision of the two provinces, and this when once settled cannot be further modified without the consent of the Powers.

IV. TERRITORY

All the provisions in question shall apply to the populations of the territories previously occupied by Greece and annexed to Albania.

V. GENDARMERY

For the maintenance of order in the southern provinces there shall be created, with officers, non-commissioned officers and gendarmes, a local gendarmery composed of representatives of each of the different religious faiths, in proportion to the number of members of each sect in these provinces. This gendarmery may serve outside the limits of these provinces only for a fixed period and then only in the case of *force majeure* as recognized by the C.I.C. The same restrictions shall apply to employment in these southern provinces of corps of gendarmery composed of men who are not natives. Officers commanding

30 GREECE BEFORE PEACE CONGRESS

gendarmery are recommended to employ in the various localities only detachments of men who belong to the same religious faith as the inhabitants of the locality.

In cases where the local element proves insufficient to furnish the proportional component part of the gendarmery, recourse will be had to natives of other Albanian provinces. In conformity with the principles set forth above, the Dutch officers will immediately proceed with the work of enrollment. It is understood that the foregoing provisions will not impair the unity of the Albanian gendarmery, as laid down by the Conference of London.

VI. ARMED FORCES

Except in the case of war or revolution in the southern provinces, non-native military units shall not be transferred to or employed in these provinces.

VII. ORTHODOX COMMUNITIES

The Orthodox Christian communities are recognized as juridical persons, like the others. They will enjoy the possession of their property, and be free to dispose of it as they please. The relations of the Orthodox communities with their spiritual chiefs will be as in the past. The ancient rights and hierarchical organization of the said communities shall not be impaired except under agreement between the Albanian Government and the Œcumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

VIII. SCHOOLS

Education shall be free. In the schools of the Orthodox communities the instruction shall be in Greek. In the three elementary classes Albanian will be taught concurrently with Greek. Nevertheless, religious education shall be exclusively in Greek.

IX. LIBERTY OF LANGUAGE

In virtue of the principle laid down in the Note of the Powers to Greece, dated April 11/24/1914, the permission to use both Albanian and Greek shall be assured in the southern provinces before all the authorities, including the Courts, as well as the elective councils.

X. OCCUPATION

The C.I.C. will take possession of the territory in question, in the name of the Albanian Government, by proceeding to the place. The officers of the Dutch Mission will at once begin the organization of the local gendarmery. Provisionally, and until the formation of this local gendarmery, the Dutch officers, with the help of local elements, will make themselves responsible for public security.

The C.I.C. will also proceed to the constitution of mixed commissions, composed of Christians and Mussulmans, in the respective numerical importance of these elements. For the time being, and until the organization of the local authorities, these commissions will assume administrative functions under the effective surveillance of the C.I.C., of which surveillance the latter will determine the extent. Before the arrival of the Dutch officers, the necessary steps will be taken by the Provisional Government of Argyrocastro for the removal from the country of all armed foreign elements. These provisions will not only be applied in that part of the province of Corytza now occupied militarily by Albania, but also in the other southern regions.

XI. RELIEF

The Albanian Government, in agreement with the C.I.C., will take the necessary measures to relieve the population which has suffered from the events of recent years.

XII. AMNESTY


A full and complete amnesty is granted to the Epirotes for all acts prior to the occupation of these provinces by the representatives of the Albanian Government. No person not of Epirote origin shall be prosecuted in respect of the period above mentioned except for non-political offenses.

XIII. GUARANTEE

The Powers who, by the Conference of London, have guaranteed the institution of Albania and established the C.I.C. guarantee the execution and maintenance of the foregoing provisions.

APPENDIX II

**STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF THRACE
ACCORDING TO NATIONALITIES**



VILAYET OF ADBIANOPLE

San-djaka	KAZAS	Greeks	Turka	Bulgarians	Armenians	Jewa	Other nationalities	Total
Adrianople	Adrianople	41,285	44,953	7,000	3,500	9,500	300	106,538
	Hafsa	9,160	8,235	730	"	"	"	18,125
	Dimotika	22,080	6,315	1,460	150	1,110	"	31,115
	Muatapha-Pasha	7,000	10,000	13,000	"	400	"	30,400
	Ortakeui	14,562	15,273	4,960	"	"	300	34,195
	Ouzoum-Keupru	18,197	10,610	5,600	"	"	"	35,407
	Kirdjali	"	32,000	"	"	"	"	32,000
		115,284	127,388	31,850	3,650	11,010	600	287,780
Kirk-Kilisse	Kirk-Kilisse	23,171	16,420	14,695	"	880	"	60,168
	Agathupolla	8,050	1,250	1,700	"	"	"	11,000
	Viza	16,815	9,140	"	"	"	"	25,955
	Midia	9,180	660	400	"	"	"	10,240
	Lule-Burgaa	7,662	13,839	655	50	230	"	22,436
	Baha-Eskil	6,624	9,728	975	"	"	"	17,327
	Tyrново	"	2,150	10,230	"	"	"	12,380
	76,502	53,187	28,655	50	1,110	"	159,504	
Rodosto	Rodosto	28,020	20,775	"	13,000	2,500	"	62,295
	Tchorlu	11,100	13,500	"	1,600	1,300	"	27,500
	Malgara	15,020	14,380	2,730	3,200	"	396	35,736
	Harloupolla	3,410	15,060	250	"	"	"	18,720
		55,550	63,725	2,980	17,600	3,800	396	144,251
Gallipoli	Gallipoli	17,869	11,487	"	1,250	1,850	"	32,456
	Madytos	8,967	5,252	"	30	"	"	14,249
	Myriophyton	19,206	1,589	"	"	"	"	20,775
	Periatasia	12,046	2,935	"	"	"	"	14,981
	Keshan	12,343	11,370	2,000	"	"	"	25,713
		70,481	32,613	2,000	1,280	1,850	"	108,174
Dedeagatch	Dedeagatch	7,371	10,870	11,358	350	230	"	29,979
	Enos	3,600	3,590	"	"	"	"	7,190
	Sufl	17,680	32,140	5,380	30	20	100	55,550
		28,651	46,400	16,738	380	250	100	92,719
Gumuldjina	Gumuldjina	9,160	50,000	10,550	800	1,200	"	71,710
	Xanthi	10,275	22,000	1,695	100	80	"	34,150
	Achi-Teheleml	2,310	20,000	12,875	"	"	"	35,185
	Dari-Dere	"	20,000	500	"	"	"	20,500
	Egri-Dere	"	35,000	"	"	"	"	35,000
	Suitan-Yeri	"	38,000	"	"	"	"	38,000
		21,745	185,000	25,620	900	1,280	"	234,545
Total in the Vilayet.....	866,363	508,311	107,843	24,060	19,800	1,036	1,026,973	

VILAYET OF CONSTANTINOPL

Constantinople	Stamboul	45,520	213,605	2,859	78,241	10,814	7,502	358,541
	Pera	175,200	90,178	1,472	40,989	27,877	123,856	459,372
	Kutchok-Tehekmedje	14,495	4,950	"	3,500	100	150	23,195
		235,215	308,733	4,331	122,730	38,791	131,308	841,108
Chatalja	Chatalja	32,225	7,200	"	30	25	20	39,630
	Bonyouk-Tehekmetje	11,681	3,680	"	"	"	"	15,861
	Sifvri	10,851	4,920	"	873	2,010	230	18,884
		54,787	16,100	"	903	2,035	250	74,075
Soutari	Skutari	34,640	81,117	"	30,360	5,670	17,000	168,787
	Kharislimi	9,670	10,500	"	2,200	25	"	22,395
	Guehize	8,000	12,300	"	"	"	300	20,800
	Princez Islanda	10,250	670	"	300	"	800	12,020
	Belkoz	2,567	4,894	"	1,900	"	897	9,788
	Chil	9,800	14,800	"	800	"	"	24,900
		74,457	134,281	"	35,560	5,695	18,497	258,490
Total in the Vilayet....	364,459	449,114	4,331	159,193	48,521	150,055	1,173,673	
Total in THRACE.....	730,822	957,425	112,174	183,253	65,621	151,151	2,200,646	

APPENDIX III

GREEK POPULATIONS

1.	Vilayet of Aidin.....	622,810
2.	— Brussa	278,421
3.	Independent Sandjak of Ismid.....	73,134
4.	— — of Dardanelles	38,830
5.	Tenedos	3,762
6.	Imbros	8,125
7.	Mytilene	115,773
8.	Chios	69,724
9.	Samos	47,277
10.	Nicaria	12,760
11.	Castellorizon	10,000
12.	Rhodes and Dodecanesus	102,727
	Total	1,383,333

APPENDIX IV

GREEK POPULATIONS

1.	Vilayet of Sivas	99,376
2.	— Angora	45,873
3.	— Trebizond	353,533
4.	— Koniah	87,021
5.	— Kastamouni	24,919
6.	— Adana	70,000
7.	Part of the Vilayet of Brussa	129,859
8.	Independent Sandjak of Ismid.....	73,134
9.	— — of Dardanelles	38,830
	Total	922,545

WESTERN ASIA MINOR

